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Introduction  
In many areas of the world rangelands are held and managed as common pool resources (CPRs) by local people 
and provide an important part of their livelihood strategies, often involving extensive grazing of livestock.  
However, the perpetuation of functioning common property regimes, which are both socially inclusive and 
effectively enforceable is increasingly being challenged by social and political drivers from both within and 
outside local CPR systems.  In worst cases ‘open access’ scenarios may ensue, where unregulated resource 
access and use prevails, or there may be capture of the commons by elite groups.  In South Africa the property 
regimes that exist in communal areas were fundamentally shaped by former colonial and apartheid policies of 
centralised social-political control but the post-1994 era has been characterised by an effective vacuum, both in 
terms of policy for governance and management of communal resources and our understanding of how these 
systems currently function.  Addressing this knowledge gap will be critical in the development policies for the 
management of the commons at both the local and national level.  Using empirical research findings from 
Eastern Cape Province, this paper analyses the types of property regime in place for the management of common 
pool grazing resources and the key axes of struggle in their operation.    
 
Materials & Methods  
Research was undertaken at six case study communities, encompassing the former homelands of Ciskei and 
Transkei.  Primary data was collected through group interviews and semi-structured interviews administered to 
key informants at each settlement.  This was augmented by participant observation and available secondary data. 
 
Results & Discussion 
The results suggest that recognisable common property regimes governing the access to and management of 
rangeland resources are largely absent in communal areas of Eastern Cape Province and a number of cross-
cutting constraints to their operation were identified (Bennett et al., 2010).  Availability of rangeland is critical, 
and differed considerably between communities.  Inadequate grazing resources, particularly in the former Ciskei, 
make it difficult to define boundaries for communal grazing as livestock range over increasingly large areas 
when forage availability is low.  Moreover, existing boundaries are largely arbitrary constructs of apartheid 
planning and are often disputed, which exacerbates difficulties in communal management and encourages ‘open 
access’ grazing.  Fencing has been unable to provide an effective solution, as it is simply removed in most cases.  
A further, fundamental, constraint to the current ability of communities to engage in rangeland management 
appears to be the lack of local institutions with an explicit resource management remit.  In their absence, there is 
little attempt at a community level to control how livestock graze or to manage ‘key resource’ areas as forage 
reserves.  In the former Ciskei, for example, community-based civic structures such as Resident’s Associations 
are now widespread but, despite ostensibly being responsible for all aspects of governance, appear to play no 
effective role in range management.  In the former Transkei, issues of natural resource management are further 
complicated by the continued existence of traditional authorities such as chiefs and village headmen alongside 
emerging civic organisations of community governance.  Whilst both sets of structures claim jurisdiction over 
land administration, neither seems to play an active role in the management of rangeland on a commons basis.   
 
Conclusions 
The common struggles identified in the management of communal rangelands provide important lessons for 
policy formulation at both the provincial and national level in South Africa.  Firstly, community boundaries 
should be sufficiently flexible to facilitate access to adequate forage resources for stock.  This runs counter to 
current government philosophy, which seems intent on entrenching historically constructed boundaries through 
the re-instatement of fencing.  Furthermore, co-management of rangeland resources across boundaries by local 
communities is imperative if best use is to be made of them in the long term.  This will only be possible if locally 
accountable institutions with an explicit resource management remit are established, not only within existing 
villages but across communities by ‘nesting’ within higher structures of local governance.  
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 BACKGROUND 
 In many areas of the world rangelands are held and managed as common 
pool resources by local people and provide an important part of their 
livelihood strategies.  However, the perpetuation of functioning common 
property regimes (CPRs), which are both socially inclusive and effectively 
enforceable is increasingly being challenged by social and political drivers 
from both within and outside local commons systems.  In worst cases 
‘open access’ scenarios may ensue, where unregulated resource access 
and use prevails, or there may be capture of the commons by elite groups 
(Ostrom et al. 1999).  In South Africa the property regimes that exist in 
communal areas have been fundamentally shaped by former colonial and 
apartheid policies of centralised social-political control (Bennett and 
Barrett 2007).  However, the post-1994 era has been characterised by an 
effective vacuum, both in terms of policy for the governance and 
management of communal resources and our understanding of how these 
systems currently function (Bennett et al. 2010).  Addressing this 
knowledge gap will be critical in the development of policies for the 
management of the commons at both the local and national level.  Using 
empirical findings from Eastern Cape Province, this research analyses the 
types of property regime in place and how effective these are in the 
management of communal grazing resources, drawing on best practice to 
inform policy.    
 
 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 Research was undertaken from 2006-2010 at six case study villages in 
the former homelands of Ciskei and Transkei in Eastern Cape Province 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Location of study sites in Eastern Cape Province 
 
 Primary data were collected through group interviews and semi-structured 
interviews administered to key informants at each settlement. This work 
was augmented by transect walks, participant observation and available 
secondary data. 
 
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The key findings from the villages in each former homeland area are 
summarised in Table 1.  The rangelands and their associated governance 
systems have many similarities in both the former Ciskei and Transkei 
regions and several common constraints to effective rangeland 
management are apparent: - 
• Availability of grazing land: At most sites the amount of rangeland is 
limited relative to the number of livestock leading to high stocking rates 
and heavy pressure on forage resources. 
• Fencing: In the absence of active herding of stock by owners, fencing is 
the only mechanism by which livestock movements can be controlled.  
Where it is absent enforcement of grazing boundaries is virtually 
impossible. 
• Institutions: Although institutions (civil society or traditional) of land 
access and control are in place at all sites, most do not play an active role 
in the collective management of commons resources such as rangeland. 
This makes it almost impossible to enact and enforce community-level 
grazing management decisions within most of the villages. 
 
  
 
 Table 1: Key features of villages in each area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The generality of these constraints suggest that functioning common property 
regimes are largely absent in communal areas of Eastern Cape.  In many 
cases this has resulted in limited or no management of local rangeland 
resources and poor resource quality.  Nevertheless, where appropriate local 
conditions exist, CPRs can and do still operate.  One of the case study sites, 
Allanwater, a former commercial farm, provides an example of where an 
effective CPR is in place.  Key to this is has been the post-apartheid formation 
of a Communal Property Association (CPA).  This gives secure user rights over 
rangeland to all farmers at the village, who then take collective responsibility 
for maintaining fenced rangeland boundaries with neighbouring communities 
and the resting of rangeland camps to ensure continuity of forage.  Moreover, 
rangeland at Allanwater is in the best condition of any of the six study sites and 
this translates into good livestock production, with wool yields averaging 
4kg/animal, a figure comparable with commercial systems.  
  
 CONCLUSION 
 Rebuilding sustainable CPR systems within Eastern Cape Province will not be 
straightforward or indeed feasible in all cases given the historical inequalities 
and limitations that afflict many former homeland areas.  However, empirical 
evidence suggests that collective management that both maintains resource 
integrity and animal production is still possible in communal areas.  A key part 
of this will be the development of institutions with a specific commons 
management remit, which are locally driven and are able to embed collective 
rights over the commons at the community level.  This has implications for 
current efforts at land reform in South Africa, and suggests that land 
redistribution must be complemented by concerted efforts at tenure reform that 
actively support the emergence of community-based institutions of collective 
resource management. 
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HOMELAND  AREA 
FEATURE Ciskei (3 sites) Transkei (3 sites) 
Site history  Mixture of colonial planning (1 
site) and transferred commercial 
farms (2 sites). 
All sites established under colonial 
rule with subsequent ‘betterment’ 
planning imposed. 
Livelihood basis Ranges from essentially cash-
income based to dependent 
largely on agriculture. 
Largely agrarian in all cases.  
Institutions Civil society structures in the form 
of Residents’ Associations (RAs) 
and Communal Property 
Associations (CPAs).   
Traditional leadership (Chiefs, 
Headmen and associated 
committees) in place at all sites.   
Rangeland area Generally relatively small ranging 
from 1200-2000 ha. 
Extensive ranging in extent from 
2000-6000 ha. 
Rangeland 
boundaries 
 
Not strictly enforced due to 
absence of fencing (2 sites) but 
clearly defined through fencing at 
1 site.  
Relatively well-defined by perimeter 
fencing at 2 sites, but limited 
enforcement at 1 site. 
 
Rangeland user 
group 
Poorly defined due to 
encroachment on resource by 
outsiders at 2 sites but well 
established through membership 
of a CPA at 1 site.   
Generally clearly identified at 2 
sites but with some encroachment 
on rangeland by outsiders, 
nonetheless.  Poorly defined at 1 
site. 
Rangeland 
management 
system 
Ranges from open access 
grazing (2 sites) to functioning 
common property regime at 1 
site, including attempts at 
rotational resting of range. 
Open access prevails at 1 site but 
‘minimum’ common property regime 
involving defined boundaries and 
user group but no internal 
management, at other 2 sites.   
Range condition Highly variable, ranging from very 
poor at 2 sites to good at former 
commercial farm where CPR has 
been maintained. 
Ranges from poor to very poor at 
most sites. 
